Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make? - commentary by Carl E. Walsh




t is very appropriate that a conference on
monetary policy transparency begin with a
paper by Alex Cukierman. His 1986 paper with
Allan Meltzer was the first modern treatment of
transparency and the model developed in that paper
continues to serve as the basic framework for much
of the recent work in this area.
Economists at most major central banks seem
to feel the average inflation bias that occupied so
much space in academic journals has been con-
quered. Whether it is because they now know to
just do the right thing (McCallum 1995), because
they target only the natural rate of output (Blinder,
1998; Svensson, 1999), or because they have gained
reputations as inflation fighters through increased
transparency and greater accountability is less cer-
tain. While many central banks have adopted operat-
ing procedures that are designed to provide the public
with clearer and more complete information about
policy decisions, and this increased transparency
is often cited as critical for inflation targeters,
Cukierman argues that transparency is still incom-
plete. This is true even among central banks that are
quite transparent along some dimensions, publicly
announcing inflation targets, for instance. This in-
completeness limits the ability of the public to hold
monetary policymakers accountable for their actions.
Cukierman highlights two aspects of the policy
environment that remain opaque—models and
objectives. Emphasizing the role of objectives in the
second half of his paper, Cukierman explores the
implications for inflation of asymmetric preferences
and, specifically, the case in which, at a given infla-
tion rate, output expansions are viewed as beneficial
while contractions are viewed as costly.
Cukierman notes that the different notions of
the output gap implicit in alternative models is one
source of policy opaqueness. First, I want to develop
more formally the distinction between alternative
measures of the output gap and argue that different
economic models and different definitions of the
output gap lead to different policy objectives. If
central banks are opaque about the models because
of uncertainty about the true transmission mecha-
nism of policy, then this will also be reflected in
uncertainty (and therefore opaqueness) about the
objectives of policy. Thus, uncertainty about the true
economic model and opaqueness about policy objec-
tives are intertwined. I then show that a model
commonly used in the recent literature to analyze
policy transparency arises naturally when the central
bank targets the wrong output gap. Turning to asym-
metric preferences, I provide a graphical represen-
tation of Cukierman’s model that helps to illustrate
why a positive average inflation rate arises in equi-
librium, and I then touch on the nonneutrality of
money in the New Keynesian model he uses.
TRANSPARENCY: MODELS AND
OBJECTIVES
Cukierman argues that even central banks
such as the Bank of England—that is, central banks
thought of as being very transparent—are in fact
still fairly opaque because they are not transparent
about either their exact policy objectives or the
models they use in the decisionmaking process. It
might seem hard to reconcile this view of central
banks with the general perception that monetary
policymaking in many countries has become more
transparent—after all, if we think of policymakers
as solving an optimizing problem, that problem is
characterized by the policymakers’ objectives and
the constraints they face, given by their model of
how the economy operates. So if central banks are
not transparent about either their objectives or their
constraints, what is there for them to be transparent
about? Clearly inflation targeters are transparent
about at least some of their objectives. As Cukierman
notes, however, even inflation targeters appear to
care about output objectives, yet none have made
these concerns explicit.
The Lucas Supply Curve Versus New
Keynesian Inflation Adjustment
Opaqueness about models and opaqueness
about objectives are not independent—the choice
of a particular model can determine the appropriate
objectives of policy. I want to illustrate this point
using two of the alternative models Cukierman sets
out. Cukierman actually discusses three alternative
models of the monetary transmission mechanism
to make his point that one reason central banks are
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© 2002, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.not transparent about the models they use is that
economists have not reached agreement on the
“correct model” of the economy. The three models
are (i) a monetarist model based on a Lucas-type
transmission process in which it is monetary sur-
prises that matter, (ii) a backward-looking model of
sticky price adjustment, and (iii) a forward-looking
New Keynesian model of sticky prices. I will focus
on the first and third of these models. In their most
basic form, these models imply different objectives
for monetary policy. Thus, a lack of transparency
about the central bank’s model inevitably also
reduces the transparency of its objectives.
The key equation that distinguishes the alterna-
tive frameworks links inflation and output. In the
Lucas supply curve, one has
(1)
and
where inflation is denoted by π, the actual (log) level
of real output is yt, ynt is the log natural rate of out-
put (both defined as deviations around the steady-
state level of output), and xt
L is the gap between




where yft is the log output level that would arise in
the absence of nominal rigidities (expressed as a
deviation around the steady-state level) and xt
NK is
the gap between actual output and the flexible-price
equilibrium output level.1
As Cukierman notes, the two models do not
necessarily imply the same definition of the output
gaps xt
L and xt
NK, nor do either of these theoretical
constructs correspond closely to standard empirical
methods of measuring output gaps. The first issue
to address is the relationship between these alter-
native definitions of the output gap. The appropriate
objective of monetary policy implied by these two
models differs; so, if central banks, perhaps because
of uncertainty about the structure of the economy,
are opaque about their model, it will be difficult to
be transparent about their objectives.
Output Gaps. The output gap is the difference
between actual output and some reference output
xy y t
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level. Cukierman draws a distinction between the
appropriate definition of this reference level in the
Lucas neo-monetarist approach and in the New
Keynesian approach. While measurement issues
arise in trying to make operational any concept of
the output gap, I think economic theory provides
some guidance as to which one should be the focus
of policy.
To contrast alternative interpretations of the
output gap, it will be useful to add some more struc-
ture to the model. Suppose the aggregate production
function takes the form
(3)
where z is an aggregate productivity disturbance
and Nt is aggregate employment. The utility of the
representative agent is
(4)
In the absence of any nominal rigidities, labor mar-





where 1≤θ<∞ and 1≤ µ<∞ are mark-ups in the
goods and labor markets arising from the presence
of monopolistic competition. If both the goods and
labor markets are characterized by perfect competi-
tion, θ=µ=1 and (5) and (6) reduce to the familiar
condition that the marginal product of labor equals
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption.
Letting a subscript f denote the equilibrium in
the absence of nominal rigidities, and noting that
in the absence of investment and government pur-
chases Ct=Yt=e
ztNt
a, the flexible-wage and flexible-
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1 The inflation adjustment equations in recent New Keynesian models
imply that inflation is related to expected future inflation and real
marginal cost. Real marginal cost is then related to the output gap to
yield an equation such as (2) (see Galí and Gertler, 1999). Cukierman
identifies the gap in the New Keynesian model as output minus
potential. However, the standard definition of the gap in recent New
Keynesian models is the difference between (log) output and the log
of the flexible-price equilibrium level of output. This does not corre-
spond to “potential output” in the sense that Cukierman uses it as
reflecting long-run supply factors.Expressed in log terms as a deviation around
the steady-state,2
(7)
Recall that in New Keynesian models, the output
gap is identified with the deviation of actual output
around this flexible-price output level, or
How does this gap variable compare with the gap
between output and the natural rate in models based
on a Lucas supply curve? According to Friedman
(1968),
The “natural rate of unemployment,” in
other words, is the level that would be
ground out by the Walrasian system of gen-
eral equilibrium equations, provided there
is imbedded in them the actual structural
characteristics of the labor and commodity
markets, including market imperfections,
stochastic variability in demands and sup-
plies, the costs of gathering information
about job vacancies and labor availability,
the costs of mobility, and so on.
At one level, this definition could be taken to
mean the level of employment in a New Keynesian
model is always at the natural rate. After all, the
costs of adjusting prices and wages are part of the
“structural characteristics” of the economy. Fluctua-
tions in demand induced by monetary policy alter
the level of employment ground out by the general
equilibrium model. Yet this is clearly not what econ-
omists have interpreted the natural rate to mean.
Earlier in the same paragraph from which the quota-
tion above is drawn, Friedman speaks of the unem-
ployment rate “consistent with equilibrium in the
structure of real wage rates” (emphasis in original).
This definition seems more consistent with the
notion of the flexible-price equilibrium level of
employment. Under that interpretation, the out-
put gap in the New Keynesian models is, in fact,
equal to the gap between output and the natural
level of output, and the Lucas supply curve and
New Keynesian gaps are the same.
A more common interpretation of the natural
level of output, however, corresponds to the equilib-
xy y y z t
NK
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rium output in the absence of inflation surprises,
i.e., when xt
L=0. How does output in the absence
of inflation surprises compare with the flexible-
price equilibrium level, and what is the relationship
between the gap measure xt
L and the measure xt
NK?
To answer this question, one needs to know where
the Lucas supply function comes from.
The standard motivation for the Lucas supply
function is not the information-based story originally
developed by Lucas (1972). Instead, it is based on
Fischer (1977), who shows that equation (1) can arise
when prices are flexible and goods markets are
perfectly competitive but nominal wages are set at
the start of the period, prior to observing the current
shocks (including innovations to monetary policy).
With competitive goods markets and flexible
prices, firms adjust employment to ensure the real
wage is equal to the marginal product of labor. If
Wt
— is the period t nominal wage set at the end of
period t–1, employment satisfies
In log deviations around the steady-state,
Assume the nominal wage is set to ensure that the
expected marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption is equal to the expected
marginal product of labor:
This implies, in terms of a log-linear approximation
around the steady-state, that the nominal wage is
set equal to
Note that I have assumed the productivity dis-
turbance zt follows an AR(1) process zt=ρzt–1+et,
where et is a white noise process. Equilibrium
employment is given by
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2 The log steady-state level of output is {a/[1+η–a(1–σ)]}ln[a/θµχ].and output is
Therefore, the natural rate of output defined as out-
put in the absence of price surprises is
With nominal wages fixed, a policy that stabilizes
the price level (eliminates price surprises) keeps
the real wage unchanged in the face of productivity
innovations. Employment rises with a positive pro-
ductivity shock (et>0) as firms hire more workers
until the marginal product of labor is again equal
to the (fixed) real wage. The impact of et on ynt is
et/(1–a). In contrast, the efficient, flexible-price
response is equal to γet (see equation (7)). Since
the natural rate fluctuates more in responses to
productivity innovations than does the flexible-
price equilibrium output level. A policy of price
stability, when nominal wages are sticky, leads to
too much output variability. Stabilizing the output
gap defined by xt
L is not the optimal policy when
nominal wages are sticky.
The flexible-price equilibrium will be replicated
if
(8)
This fall in prices in the face of a productivity shock
raises the real wage, reducing the demand for labor.
This ensures that the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption remains equal
to the real wage. As one would expect from the
analysis of Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), the
policy given by (8) would, in a sticky-wage environ-
ment, ensure that the nominal wage remains con-
stant, thereby undoing the distortion generated by
sticky nominal wages.
Of course, the converse results arise if prices
are sticky and policymakers attempt to avoid wage
surprises.
How does the gap between output and the nat-
ural level of output compare with the gap between
output and the flexible-price equilibrium level of
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11 γρ . Consider the impact of a positive productivity
disturbance, et>0. A policy that tries to stabilize xt
L
needs to let xt
NK rise. That is, output will expand above
the flexible-price equilibrium level. In contrast, if
the central bank focuses on stabilizing xt
NK, it will
allow output to fall below the natural rate in the
face of a positive productivity shock.
Which output gap measure should the central
bank focus on? The policy recommendation from
the Lucas model would seem to be “avoid inflation
surprises.” Yet such a policy is inefficient because
it generates economic fluctuations that are too large
in response to productivity shocks. The natural rate
is not the appropriate output benchmark for stabi-
lization policies when nominal wages are sticky.
On the other hand, if wages are flexible and prices
are sticky, eliminating inflation surprises by main-
taining zero inflation would be optimal. If the central
bank is uncertain whether the economy is charac-
terized by sticky wages or sticky prices, it will also
be uncertain about the optimal policy is should fol-
low. If this uncertainty means the central bank is
opaque about its views of the monetary transmission
mechanism, then it is also likely to be opaque with
respect to its objectives.
The general lesson is that policy objectives are
not independent of the structure of the economy.
In a Lucas supply curve model based on nominal
wage rigidity, price stability is not the optimal policy,
although it is in a New Keynesian model of sticky
prices. Both these models are based on a key simpli-
fying assumption—only one nominal variable is
sticky. With a single monetary distortion, optimal
policy calls for undoing that distortion. If both wages
and prices are sticky, then neither price stability
nor nominal wage stability will be optimal.
Targeting the Wrong Gap and Models of
Transparency. Cukierman lists another gap mea-
sure—the difference between output and potential.
Since potential is a constant in my simple example,
this gap measure is just
Suppose the central bank does focus on output
relative to potential and the economy is actually
characterized, as in New Keynesian models, by
flexible nominal wages and sticky prices. In this
case, inflation is given by 
yx z tt
NK

























while the central bank’s loss function is
(10)  
Notice that, by focusing on yt rather than xt
NK, we
have a situation in equation (10) that is equivalent
to the presence of a stochastic output target equal
to γzt. Alternatively, the central bank’s decision prob-
lem can be written in terms of yt. In this case, the
loss function is
,
and this is minimized subject to
This reveals how the productivity shock et
appears as a cost shock (and therefore leads to a
policy trade-off—see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1999)
because the central bank employs the wrong mea-
sure of the output gap. In the present model, the
socially optimal policy would set πt=0 and xt
NK=0;
but, when the central bank targets output relative to
potential, it is straightforward to show that inflation
fluctuates too much.
Transparency and a Stochastic Output Target.
When the central bank incorrectly targets output
relative to potential, we have a situation that is
equivalent to the presence of a stochastic output
target. What is interesting about this case is that
recent work on central bank transparency has often
been based on the assumption that the central bank
has a stochastic output target. Models with stochas-
tic output targets have been used by Faust and
Svensson (2001), Jensen (2000), and Walsh (2002)
to study the role of transparency. As just shown,
this situation can arise when the central bank targets
the wrong measure of the output gap, perhaps
because of the sort of model uncertainty that
Cukierman emphasizes.3
Faust and Svensson (2000) conclude that trans-
parency is desirable. In their model, transparency
takes the form of better information about the central
bank’s control error— transparency is increased if
the central bank provides more information about
its forecasts. Thus, greater transparency improves
the ability of the public to monitor the central bank
by distinguishing between control errors and stochas-
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NK Ex =+ +1 , tic shifts in the central bank’s output objective.
Improved transparency means that any deliberate
attempt by the central bank to expand output would
quickly be discovered and lead to a rise in expected
inflation. This rise in expected inflation increases
the marginal cost of an expansion, inducing the
central bank to refrain from trying to overly expand
real economic activity. Transparency acts as a disci-
plinary device (see also Walsh 2000).
Cukierman (2000) and Jensen (2000) point out
that transparency may come at a cost. By making
expected inflation more sensitive to central bank
actions, the cost of engaging in policies aimed at
stabilizing output rises. This can distort stabilization
policy and lead to excessive fluctuations in real
economic activity.
This type of distortion is common in many
systems based on an imperfect measure of perfor-
mance. Announcing a target for inflation, for exam-
ple, establishes a measure by which the central
bank’s performance can be measured. If too much
stress is placed on achieving the target (essentially
making inflation targeting a high-powered incentive
scheme), the central bank may downplay other
potentially desirable objectives. However, greater
transparency by publishing the central bank’s fore-
casts would allow the public to more easily verify
whether the central bank’s short-run target for infla-
tion is appropriate, given the central bank’s forecast
of economic conditions. In other words, greater
transparency allows the public to more closely moni-
tor the central bank.4 Better monitoring improves
the public’s ability to hold the central bank account-
able for achieving its inflation target. Thus, greater
transparency is consistent with a stricter inflation
targeting regime (i.e., a high-powered incentive
scheme with more weight placed on achieving the
target) because the public is able to determine the
appropriate state-contingent target inflation rate.
THE ROLE OF ASYMMETRIC 
PREFERENCES
The second part of Cukierman’s paper develops
the implications for inflation of asymmetric central
bank preferences. Cukierman questions the assump-
tion of symmetric preferences that is implied by
the standard quadratic specification for the central
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3 For a survey of the recent literature on central bank transparency,
see Geraats (2002). 
4 Walsh (2002) relates transparency to the ability to monitor the central
bank.bank’s loss function. Instead, he argues that, given
the rate of inflation, central banks prefer a 1 percent
output gap to a –1 percent gap. This assumption
strikes me as quite reasonable, and there are a num-
ber of ways of modeling it. Perhaps the simplest is
to subtract a linear term in the output gap from the
standard quadratic loss function. This makes the
marginal benefit of an expansion positive when
evaluated at a zero output gap. Ruge-Murcia (2001)
uses a linex function to allow for asymmetric prefer-
ences, although he assumes this applies to inflation,
not output.
Cukierman employs a specification that is very
simple but that captures the basic idea—he assumes
that as long as the output gap is positive, the central
bank cares only about inflation stabilization. When
the gap is negative, then the familiar quadratic pref-
erences kick in. In his neo-monetarist model, the
central bank must act prior to observing the current
shocks. To ensure against a bad output realization,
the policymaker sets the nominal money supply
above the zero inflation level. As a consequence,
an average inflation bias appears.
A Graphical Analysis in the New
Keynesian Model
As Cukierman notes, a similar effect arises in
his New Keynesian model, even if the central bank
can observe the shocks. It is easy to illustrate this
graphically. In Figure 1, the line labeled “Policy
Relationship” illustrates the inflation and output
gap combinations that are consistent with the cen-
tral bank’s first order condition.5 Also shown in the
figure is the inflation adjustment curve, drawn as a
solid line for the case of zero expected inflation and
a zero cost shock. Inflation occurs where the policy
relationship and the inflation adjustment curve
intersect. Assume the cost shock takes on the values
ε>0 and –ε<0 with equal probability, as indicated
by the dashed lines. Since inflation is zero when
the cost shock is –ε and positive when the shock is
ε, on average, inflation will be positive. Since private
agents will anticipate this inflation bias, expected
inflation rises, shifting the inflation adjustment
curves upward until equilibrium is established at
(x –,π –), as shown in Figure 2 where the inflation
adjustment equation for zero shock intersects the
vertical axis at βπ –. As Cukierman also notes, the
equilibrium involves positive average inflation and
a positive average output gap.
Figure 3 illustrates the effects of an increase in
the weight the central bank places on its output
objectives (an increase in the parameter A). With a
larger A, the central bank is willing to accept higher
inflation to limit declines in the output gap. As a
consequence, average inflation rises. In addition to
depending positively on A, the average inflation
rate is increasing in the variance of the cost shock.
This can be seen by increasing the distance between
the inflation adjustment curves for ε>0 and –ε<0.
42 JULY/AUGUST 2002
5 For x>0, the central bank sets π=0. For x<0, the central bank equates
the marginal rate of substitution between the output gap and inflation,
–Ax/π, to the marginal rate of transformation, κ, or κπ+Ax=0, where
A is the weight on output fluctuations in the objective function and κ
is the marginal effect of output on inflation.
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Asymmetric Preferences and Cost Shocks 














Figure 2Are Preferences Asymmetric?
Asymmetric preferences over output is one
possibility, but there are other ways in which the
central bank’s preferences may be asymmetric.
Ruge-Murcia (2001) models the asymmetry as apply-
ing to inflation. He assumes that inflation-targeting
central banks are more concerned about overshoot-
ing their inflation target than they are about under-
shooting the target. As a consequence, he finds there
is a deflationary bias. That is, average inflation will
be systematically below the announced target. This
is the opposite of Cukierman’s conclusion that infla-
tion will be systematically above target.6
The presence and form of asymmetric prefer-
ences seems to me an empirical issue. Cukierman
cites some evidence that supports his specification.
For instance, Gerlach (2000) finds some support
for a positive association between variability and
the level of inflation. For the inflation targeting
countries he studies, Ruge-Murcia (2001) finds that
average inflation is negatively related to the variance
of inflation, evidence that he interprets as supportive
of his specification. Clearly, there cannot be both
an inflation bias and a deflation bias, so this is an
area that will need to be resolved by further empiri-
cal testing.
IS THERE LONG-RUN NONNEUTRALITY
IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL?
Finally, I want to comment on the presence of
a long-run trade-off between average inflation
and the output gap in the New Keynesian model
Cukierman employs. Cukierman notes that the
existence of this trade-off leads to what he labels
an “inflation tendency.” A positive average rate of
inflation produces an output gap that is also positive
on average. If the average rate of inflation is π –>0,
then equation (2) implies the average output gap
is x –=(1–β)π –/κ>0. This situation was illustrated
in Figures 2 and 3 by the positive output gap that
accompanies the positive equilibrium inflation rate.
This apparent trade-off arises in some, but not
all, derivations of the inflation equation given by
(2). For example, suppose prices are set according
to a Calvo mechanism in which a randomly drawn
fraction 1–θ of all firms adjust their prices each
period. Adjusting firms set prices to maximize the
present discounted value of profits, subject to a
constant elasticity demand for their goods. Following
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), assume that the
other θ fraction of firms simply update their prices
based on the average rate of inflation.7 One could
think of the costs of adjusting as reflecting decision-
making costs so that each period not all firms decide
to fully optimize in setting their price.
Let ψt ˆ be the firm’s real marginal cost, with ˆ
denoting percentage deviation from the steady-state,
and β the discount factor. Then one obtains
By using the production function and the house-
hold’s marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption, real marginal cost can be elimi-
nated to yield a standard New Keynesian inflation-
adjustment equation8:
(11)    ˆˆ . πβ π κ tt t t
NK Ex =+ +1
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6 In Figure 1, make the policy relationship concave, rather than convex,
to illustrate the resulting deflationary bias.
7 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) characterize this as static
pricing. They also analyze “dynamic” pricing in which firms update
price based on the lagged inflation rate.
8 The marginal cost variable can be related to the output gap by noting
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Equilibrium Inflation with a Larger 
Weight on Output
Figure 3The critical point to note is that equation (11)
does not involve the level of the inflation rate. It is
expressed in terms of the deviation of inflation from
the steady-state. By definition, π ˆ equals zero in the
steady-state, and (11) then implies that the output
gap will also be zero, regardless of the average
steady-state rate of inflation. Thus, in this version
of the New Keynesian model there is no long-run
trade-off between the average rate of inflation and
the output gap.
CONCLUSIONS
Central banks are not transparent about their
models, for the reasons Cukierman highlighted. If
policymakers are uncertain about the true model
of the economy, then opaqueness about objectives
is not surprising, since a choice of model serves to
define the appropriate objectives. In the models
Cukierman uses to illustrate differences in the trans-
mission process, different policies are optimal. Under
the standard Lucas supply curve a la Fischer, mone-
tary policy should stabilize nominal wages; in the
basic New Keynesian model, prices should be stabi-
lized. Greater transparency about objectives is likely
to arise, therefore, only when there is greater agree-
ment on models.
Transparency is important if policymakers are
to be held accountable. It is difficult to monitor the
central bank’s performance if little information is
available about the economic outlook that forms
the basis for the central bank’s policy decisions.
Greater transparency, by improving the ability to
monitor the central bank, contributes to making
policymakers more accountable for achieving the
central bank’s inflation target.
As for asymmetric preferences, I find it plausible
that central bankers are not indifferent between
expansions and recessions or between inflation
target overshoots and undershoots. How important
this is empirically, however, is an open question.
REFERENCES 
Blinder, Alan S. Central Banking in Theory and Practice.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.
Christiano, Lawrence J.; Eichenbaum, Martin and Evans,
Charles. “Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of
a Shock to Monetary Policy.” Working Paper 8403, National
Bureau of Economic Research, July 2001.
Clarida, Richard; Galí, Jordi and Gertler, Mark. “The Science
of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective.”
Journal of Economic Literature, December 1999, 37(4),
pp. 1661-707.
Cukierman, Alex. “Accountability, Credibility, Transparency
and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem.” Unpublished
manuscript, The Eitan Berglas School of Economics,
Tel Aviv University, 2000.
___________ and Meltzer, Allan H. “A Theory of Ambiguity,
Credibility and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric
Information.” Econometrica, September 1986, 54(5), pp.
1099-128.
Dixit, Avinash. “A Repeated Game Model of Monetary
Union.” Economic Journal, October 2000, 110(466), pp.
759-80.
Erceg, Christopher J.; Henderson, Dale and Levin, Andrew
T. “Optimal Monetary Policy with Staggered Wage and
Price Contracts.” Journal of Monetary Economics, October
2000, 46(2), pp. 281-313.
Faust, Jon and Svensson, Lars E.O. “Transparency and
Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals.”
International Economic Review, May 2001, 42(2), pp.
369-97.
Fischer, Stanley. “Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations,
and the Optimal Money Supply Rule.” Journal of Political
Economy, February 1977, 85(1), pp. 191-206.
Friedman, Milton. “The Role of Monetary Policy.” American
Economic Review, March 1968, 58(1), pp. 1-17.
Geraats, Petra. “Central Bank Transparency.” Economic
Journal, 2002 (forthcoming).
Galí, Jordi and Gertler, Mark. “Inflation Dynamics: A
Structural Econometric Investigation.” Journal of Monetary
Economics, October 1999, 44(2), pp. 195-222.
Gerlach, Stefan. “Asymmetric Policy Reactions and Inflation.”
BIS, April 2000.
Jensen, Henrik. “Optimal Degrees of Transparency in
Monetary Policymaking.” University of Copenhagen,
December 2000.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. “Expectations and the Neutrality of
Money.” Journal of Economic Theory, April 1972, 4(2),
pp. 103-24.
44 JULY/AUGUST 2002
Walsh REVIEWMcCallum, Bennett T. “Two Fallacies Concerning Central
Bank Independence.” American Economic Review, May
1995, 85(2), pp. 207-11.
Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J. “Inflation Targeting under
Asymmetric Preferences.” Université de Montréal, June
2001.
Svensson, Lars E.O. “How Should Monetary Policy Be
Conducted in an Era of Price Stability,” in New Challenges
for Monetary Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
1999, pp. 195-259.
Walsh, Carl E. “Market Discipline and Monetary Policy.”
Oxford Economic Papers, April 2000, 52(2), pp. 249-71.
___________. “Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation
Targeting.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 2002
(forthcoming).
JULY/AUGUST 2002      45
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS Walsh46 JULY/AUGUST 2002
Walsh REVIEW